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Abstract
Part I of this Essay discusses the reasons for Lithuania to join the NATO, Part II lays out the
costs of doing so, Part III reflects on what that would mean for Lithuania’s position in the EU, and
Part IV suggests a two-pronged solution to include Lithuania in NATO
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INTRODUCTION
A number of nations around the world, and the majority of
those in Europe, claim to live in "a" or "the" "crossroad" of vari-
ous commercial, cultural, historical, and strategic routes. For a
crossroad to function properly, it must be regulated by a traffic
light or traffic cop. In addition, an effective traffic crossroad re-
quires a consensus among interested parties to abide by com-
monly recognized and reasonable traffic rules and regulations.
Such is also the case of countries that lie at a crossroads. Condi-
tions affecting these countries must be stable and internationally
respected so as to enable those countries to serve as crossroads,
which, in times of peace, can provide a great benefit to all neigh-
boring countries.
Lithuanians have always discerned themselves as inhabitants
of such a crossroad. Since Lithuania established statehood in
1230, it has hoped to become an integral, peaceful, and orderly
part of Europe. Sadly, history has been cruel to Lithuania's cor-
ner of the globe. In ancient times, it was the Lithuanians them-
selves who asserted super-national authorities. For the past sev-
eral centuries, however, their neighbors have had the upper
hand. In ancient times, the rule of force dominated interna-
tional relations in this part of the world. Today, the rule of inter-
national law governs the Lithuanian crossroad, and is the pre-
dominant principle of domestic and international policy.
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sents their own thoughts. The authors also express their sincere appreciation of the




The Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliament, Professor
Vytautas Landsbergis explained:
One could see Lithuania's name on maps of the old Europe,
and, at times, inscribed in rather large letters. Lithuania
adopted the oldest in the region legal code, the Statute of
Lithuania, initiated the Union of the Eastern and Western
churches, the present Greek Catholic Church. In the cultural
and confessional divisions of Europe, she is the easternmost
point of Rome's influence. It is an ancient state and not
some kind of "new democracy" which has allegedly emerged
from the ruins of the Soviet Union and which may just be as it
is or may disappear again .... When stood on the shore of
the Baltic sea, a Lithuanian always gazes Westwards .... Lith-
uania is a part of Europe, and, if the need arises, will defend
Europe once again, even if alone.1
The fifty years of recent occupation, which the West never
recognized as an occupation, are an irony of history for
Lithuanians. Having survived the failed experiment of commu-
nist "rule by brutality," Lithuanians are now attempting to en-
force appropriate rules rendering their crossroads stable, pros-
perous, and beneficial for themselves and others. Since the re-
establishment of independence, Lithuania has enforced these
universally recognized rules while striving to promote a market
economy, rule of law, separation of power, and other interna-
tional principles of behavior. These are the crossroad rules
Lithuanians are living under. Accordingly, Lithuanians expect
other states to abide by the same rules.
I. THE CROSSROAD OF THE MODERN AGE
History has taught the Lithuanian people the indispensable
lesson that Lithuania must be a part of Europe in every way. In
many respects, it already functions as an integral part of Europe.
It has opted to be a member of institutions that embody and
protect Europe's identity and well-being. Lithuania is a member
of the United Nations,2 the Council of Europe,3 the Organiza-
1. Lithuanian Parliament Chairman Professor Vytautas Landsbergis, Lecture at the
Royal Institute of International Relations of Belgium (Mar. 6, 1997).
2. See U.N. CHARTER (1945). The U.N. Charter committed member nations "to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights." Id., art. 1. The purposes for founding
the United Nations include the maintenance of "international peace and security," the
development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of
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tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe4 ("OSCE"), the
Council of the Baltic Sea States,5 and other smaller or more spe-
cialized pan-European and regional institutions. The embrace
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 6 ("NATO") and the
equal rights and self-determination of peoples," the achievement of "international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or human-
itarian character," and the "promotion of human rights." Id., pmbl. The United Na-
tions is the "dominant intergovernmental organization on our planet .. " Michael J.
Reppas, The Lawfulness of Humanitarian Intervention, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 463, 463
(1997).
3. See DR. KLAus-DIETER BORCHARDT, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, THE ORIGINS AND
GROWTH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 6-7 (1995) (describing Council of Europe). On May
5, 1949, leaders of European nations met at the Hague and founded the Council of
Europe in order to foster political cooperation between its Member States and serve as
an instrument of intergovernmental cooperation, separate from the European Commu-
nity, that pursues closer links between the countries of Europe and promotes their eco-
nomic and social progress. Id. The Council of Europe oversees a wide range of eco-
nomic, cultural, social, and legal conventions. Id.
4. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14
I.L.M. 1292. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE"), for-
merly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE"), is a multilat-
eral forum of which all European states, the United States, Canada, and several Central
Asian states are participants. Bonnie Jenkins, The Enhancement of Political and Military
Stability in the Former Yugoslavia Through the Use of International Law: Annex 1-B of the Gen-
eral Framework Agreement, 19 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1920, 1922 n.6 (1996). Thirty-five lead-
ers from Europe and North America signed the Helsinki Accords in Helsinki, Finland
on August 1, 1975, which formalized the original CSCE. Id. The Helsinki Accords con-
tain a commitment composed of three major parts addressing military, economic, and
human rights, while the Vienna Document 1994 contains enhanced confidence-build-
ing measures, adding to the Vienna Document 1992, which encompassed the enhanced
provisions of the Helsinki Accords. Id.; see James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve,
Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized & Solution-
Oriented Protection, 10 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 115, 200 (1997) (explaining process for con-
flict resolution of OSCE). The OSCE's mechanism for cooperation and consultation
was developed at the "Valletta Meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, and en-
dorsed by the Berlin Meeting of the then-CSCE Council in June 1991." Id. This proce-
dure provides that if a member state concludes that there is a developing emergency
situation, such member state may demand immediate clarification from other involved
states. Id. "The strength of the OSCE mechanism is its ability to get a disparate group
of states to come quickly to the negotiating table. It shows that states can agree to
formalize a duty to consult with each other within tightly defined time limits in re-
sponse to a perceived crisis." Id.
5. Information provided by the Council of the Baltic Sea States (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal). The Council of the Baltic Sea States was established
at a conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen in March 1992. Id. Its
objectives are to strengthen the existing cooperation among the Baltic Sea States, and
to serve as a forum for intensified cooperation and cooperation on key issues, such as
democratic consolidation, development of infrastructure, trade, economy, and the pro-
tection of the environment. Id.
6. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (1949) [here-
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European Union7 ("EU" or "European Union"), however, are
the unchallenged top priorities and ultimate goals of sovereign
Lithuania. Irrespective of what political parties and personalities
ruled the independent state, Lithuania has continuously de-
clared these goals, and eagerly anticipates the launch of negotia-
tions with the European Union, most likely in early 1998. It
would be hard to find a country that has a more genuine desire,
or a more eager readiness, to enter NATO and the European
Union than Lithuania.
A. Goals of An Independent Lithuania
The road leading to these goals is winding and bumpy for
various reasons. Criteria for EU membership are specific, eco-
nomically and internally oriented, and technically complex, thus
making it difficult for an aspiring Member State to comply with
them. Based on objective criteria, the preparedness of candi-
dates can be deducted easily. Membership in the European
Union is seen almost entirely as dependent on the "homework"
accomplished by an associated country' and no more than that.
There are few apparent geopolitical stakes involved in EU en-
largement.
By contrast, it is the geopolitical dimension of NATO en-
largement that is critical. Superficially, NATO poses fewer re-
quirements for membership, however, such requirements are
strategic. The whole process is destined to be oriented to the
security and interests of not only the entire European continent,
but that of North America as well. Decisions on NATO enlarge-
ment is, at this moment, the most important variable in the
formula that will determine Europe's political future. NATO en-
largement must be carefully crafted, or future generations may
be paying for fatal errors committed by contemporary politi-
cians.
inafter the North Atlantic Treaty] (governing North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO")).
7. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAw 18 (1993) (explaining difference between European Union and European Com-
munity). The European Community, as a subset of the European Union, remains the
entity responsible for most European Union activity and, therefore, most references
should be to the European Community rather than the European Union. Id.
8. See MARTIN WESTLAKE, THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 390 (1995) (dis-
cussing EU association agreements).
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Lithuanian officials have been repeatedly asked by non-Lith-
uanian citizens, especially current members of the Common-
wealth of Independent States9 ("CIS"), about Lithuania's motiva-
tion for membership in NATO. Most of these questions are
often colored with undisguised dissent or, at least, a cool atti-
tude. A full list of reasons would be unbearably lengthy and not
appropriate for this Article. A good answer to this inquiry, how-
ever, has been repeatedly stated by the Polish President Alexan-
dre Kwasnewski, who stated that his country wants to enter
NATO for the same reasons that NATO members do not want to
leave it.
It is a universally recognized presumption of international
politics that national security is an essential element of statehood
that is normally defended at almost any cost. The preamble of
the North Atlantic Treaty"0 confirms this by stating that NATO
defends "peace with all peoples and all governments . . .free-
dom, common heritage and civilization of its peoples, founded
on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law
..., stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.., peace
and security."" Those are universal values upon which any
healthy state must be based. Nobody could convince Lithuania
that yearning for peace or stability is desiring too much.
There will be no stability in Europe if the sovereignty of
states is not ensured by appropriate and legitimate means. Vari-
ous international documents, including the most recent 1996
OSCE Lisbon Declaration, 2 enshrine the right of sovereign
states to choose their security arrangements, including the right
to belong to defense alliances. History shows us that the best way
to secure Lithuanian statehood, proceed with reforms, and make
our own contribution to the building of a new Europe is by be-
coming a member of a united family, instead of passively observ-
ing the transition of the continent as an outsider. This "Euro-
pean family" is "married" through several institutions, of which
NATO and the European Union are the most important.
Some global political leaders, such as Russian President Bo-
9. The former Soviet republics now comprise the Commonwealth of Independent
States ("CIS").
10. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 6, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243
(1949).
11. Id., pmbl.
12. It is called "The OSCE Lisbon Document of 1996," 36 I.L.M. 486 (1997).
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ris Yeltsin," support the Baltic States' neutrality. Neutrality,
however, is not a solution for Lithuania, and in fact would per-
petuate Lithuania as an outsider to the European family. The
events of the 1930s, such as the declarations of neutrality by a
number of Central European states including Lithuania, and
their subsequent occupation either by Nazi Germany or the So-
viet Union, shows that the neutrality of the Baltic States is incom-
patible with their national security goals. This is true even in the
light of present differences with the World War II era. The costs
of a fully independent but truly neutral state, such as Switzerland
and Sweden, is prohibitive. Sharing common security expenses
would be advantageous. It would cost less, thus allowing the
spared resources to boost development, and creating genuine se-
curity by intertwining states' interests and, hence, eliminating
motives for selfish behavior. Lithuania fully agrees with the U.S.
Secretary of State Madeline Albright's statement that "l[t] he costs
[of NATO enlargement] are reasonable and many would arise
whether NATO expands or not. Countries aspiring to member-
ship will have to modernize their armed forces whether they are
really in or out of NATO - if anything, military spending would
be higher in an insecure, unattached Central Europe." 4
Lithuania sees NATO as the best tool of security. NATO has
proven its efficiency throughout the Cold War and has demon-
strated its potential to adapt to present circumstances. NATO is
neither a shield from, nor a weapon against, any specific target.
Rather, it is an assurance of security from all threats, including
internal ones. The aspirations for NATO membership are al-
ready boosting reforms in Central Europe, especially with re-
spect to the civil control of the military, improving neighborly
relations, protecting minority rights, and locking in investments
in the area. The assumption follows that, if properly managed,
NATO enlargement will expand the zone of stability and pros-
perity eastwards.
Replying to the skepticism voiced by some of his fellow
countrymen about NATO enlargement in general, and referring
to the present security situation in Europe, U.S. Deputy Secre-
13. Russia's long-term strategy toward the Baltics was designed primarily in the
second half of 1996 by the Security Council of the Russian Federation as well as a circle
of top Russian foreign policy experts.
14. Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger is Better, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 21, 22.
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tary of State Strobe Talbot described NATO's historic signifi-
cance, for both current and aspiring members:
NATO has never been solely a military instrument; it has al-
ways served a political function as well. After World War II,
the alliance helped Italy and Germany become part of the
trans-Atlantic community. It promoted the consolidation of
civilian led democracy in Spain. It spurred reconciliation be-
tween France and Germany laying the ground for the Euro-
pean Union. Its unified command removed the incentive for
military competition among West European powers. It
helped keep the peace between Greece and Turkey .... In
the past, particularly in the 19th century, alliances not only
served to wage or deter war, they also helped manage rela-
tions among their member-states. Insofar as NATO follows in
this tradition, the end of the cold war has actually buttressed
its rationale - and should make it easier for those who ear-
lier regarded the alliance as a necessary but temporary evil to
see it instead as a lasting good.15
Lithuanians agree with Mr. Talbott that it would be the
height of injustice and irony if the Baltic nations were, in effect,
blacklisted from NATO membership for the next fifty years be-
cause they had been, against their own free will, part of the anti-
Western Warsaw Pact 16 for the past fifty years.
Extension of NATO's zone of peace, stability, and prosperity
is crucial to Central Europe which now lies in the gray zone of a
security vacuum. Rightly or wrongly, everything that is consid-
ered "gray" today is conceptually placed in the East, and as-
sumed to be under the domination from the East. At best,
"gray" invokes the notion of buffer zones, and is a tribute of a
faltered security system that Lithuania least desires. The security
vacuum and gray-buffer zones exist as a result of the unmet se-
curity needs of the Central European countries, including the
15. Strobe Talbott, Russia Has Nothing to Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997, at A19.
16. The Warsaw Pact unites the Soviet Block, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet
Union against the West, and has been described as:
[A] carbon copy of the North Atlantic Treaty ... [having] much the same
scope as the North Atlantic Treaty and [binding] as firmly. Its key, the restora-
tive clause (Article 4), strides along, idea by idea, almost work by work, with
the North Atlantic counterpart, Article 5. In both cases, the casus foederis is
an armed attack; in both cases, the commitment is to render such assistance,
including armed assistance, as the committee deems necessary.
WILLIAM WELCH, SOVIET COMMITMENTS TO COLLECTIVE ACTION, IN ALLIANCE POLICY IN
THE COLD WAR 271, 278 (Arnold Wolfers ed., 1959).
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previously flip-flopping Bulgaria, whose intention to seek full
membership in NATO is a logical addition to Europe's demo-
cratic map.
NATO enlargement, moreover, will extend universal demo-
cratic values beyond Europe's limits. Most importantly, enlarge-
ment gives a chance to contribute to the development of democ-
racy in Russia itself, which struggles to find sound justification
for her reluctance to see democracy and stability in her Western
neighborhood. Coexistence of NATO and Russia in a wider
neighborhood would be a sign of new times for which the Baltic
States have long hoped.
B. Russia's Concerns Regarding NATO Enlargement
Russia is the most severe headache for NATO enlargement
strategists.17 In particular, Russia has spoken out against the Bal-
tic States' membership in NATO, and has voiced concerns about
NATO as a military threat to Russia. Many of these concerns,
however, stem from Russian misperceptions.
Russia is a major power with superfluous conventional
forces and an excess nuclear weaponry, which is being neither
properly cared for nor controlled. In addition, Russia is still un-
decided about its political orientation. The West seeks to keep
Russia in its good graces, lest it regress again into an actively anti-
Western military threat. The legacy of the Soviet past, with Mos-
cow as its heart, coupled with the reality of Russia as the succes-
sor of the obligations and rights of the former USSR, makes this
power the potential embryo of a future military opponent to
NATO. That is the reason why the triple task strategy of NATO,
consisting of adaptation, enlargement, and relations with Russia,
focuses predominantly on the last task.
1. The Legitimacy of Russia's Concerns
Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is based on sev-
eral potentially valid arguments. Such opposition, though lim-
ited, also exists in some states neighboring Russia, and even
among some of the NATO Allies themselves. Western critics re-
17. See Mikhail A. Alexseev, Russia's Cold Peace Consensus: Transcending the Presiden-
tial Election, 21 S.P.G. FLETCHER F. WORLD Art. 33 (1997) (discussing NATO enlarge-
ment). "President Yeltsin has repeatedly underscored that NATO's enlargement would
'spread the flames of war across Europe.'" Id. at 39.
1997] 1643
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peat the Russian arguments, raising the financial implications of
expansion, which the Allies would be expected to bear. It would
be erroneous to ignore Russia's legitimate security interests.
The question, however, is where these interests cross over the
Russian border, and infringe upon the legitimate interests and
sovereign rights of other states, and how to face the dilemma of
prudently balancing these interests.
Russia's dislike of NATO is mainly a result of decades of So-
viet anti-NATO propaganda. Russian domestic opinion-makers
feed images of the Alliance as an evil force that is attempting to
take over the area which was formerly dominated by the "benev-
olent mother Russia." Central and Eastern European countries
are criticized as ungrateful "children" throwing themselves into
the arms of a new, richer sponsor, for venturing out into interna-
tional alliances alone, and for not joining any Eastern military
alliance.
2. NATO as a Military Threat to Russia
From another angle, Russia points repeatedly to the poten-
tial of NATO's military capacity, both nuclear and conventional,
that touches Russia's borders. Russia ignores the NATO commit-
ment to reduce its nuclear capacity by roughly eighty percent
throughout this decade, and the leveling off of NATO's conven-
tional capacity. NATO's opponents in Russia argue that, despite
the end of the Cold War, NATO has not transformed itself.
They also contend that NATO still represents the residue of an
era of confrontation between the East and the West. They do
not find persuasive the statements from the West that NATO is
shrinking its military might in Europe. The assurances that
NATO neither needs, plans, nor intends to deploy nuclear weap-
ons or station NATO troops in the new Member States in the
foreseeable future does not persuade Russian opponents either.
They claim that the promise of non-deployment is not legally
binding and could be easily interpreted as deliberately omitting
circumstances such as armed conflicts, thus circumventing the
legal promise.
The strongest resistance to NATO enlargement comes from
Russia's military. Former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs An-
drey Kozyrev explained that officials of his armed forces perpetu-
ate an evil image of NATO in order tojustify their positions and
NATO E[NLARGEMENT
negotiate larger budgetary allocations. The discontent about
NATO's conventional superiority has inspired demands from
Russia that no NATO military installations be erected on the ter-
ritory of new NATO members and that no foreign forces ever be
deployed there. If this particular demand is honored in prac-
tice, the security guaranties from NATO would be worthless, and
NATO "enlargement" would be a fraud.
3. Russia Against the Baltics in NATO
The West seeks to accommodate Russia's fears through a
dialogue which will hopefully lead to compromise. In spite of
Russia's objections, the question for Moscow is not "if" but "how
much" NATO will expand. While there is some tolerance for the
wording which favors admission of Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic, Russian officials are tough about the aspirations
of the Baltic States.
Russia seems to be categorically incapable of conceptualiz-
ing a scenario in which former parts of the USSR, such as the
militarily occupied Baltic States, could become NATO members.
The Kremlin reacted to the visit of Javier Solana, NATO Secre-
tary General to Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidjan in
February 1997 and later to the Central Asian states by warning
that this region is not NATO's responsibility. 18 NATO, thus, real-
ized Russia's true, centuries-old feelings about "spheres of influ-
ence." Why are the Baltics Russia's responsibility, rather than
Turkey's or Romania's, for example? Is it because the CIS struc-
tures have more expertise in conflict prevention and providing
security than NATO? Why is Moscow jealous of NATO's close
contacts further abroad, with members of Partnership for
Peace 9 ("PFP")? There is no need to articulate an answer, but a
18. Those trips were planned visits by the Secretary General of NATO, Javier So-
lana, to the countries that participate in the Parmership for Peace ("PFP"), with the aim
of promoting the objectives of the PFP.
19. Partnership For Peace Invitation Issued by Heads of State and Government
participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Jan. 11, 1994, reprinted in
NATO Partnership For Peace 1 (NATO, 1994). The Heads of State of NATO nations
created the PFP as an "immediate and practical program that will transform the rela-
tionship between NATO and participating states. This new program goes beyond dia-
logue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace." Captain
Davis Brown, The Role of Regional Organizations in Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F.L. REv. 235,
254 (1997). The objectives of the PFP were to commit to openness of national defense
planning and budgeting, to keep the military under "democratic," or "civilian" control,
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need to assess this reaction in proposing arguments for NATO
enlargement.
The meeting between Solana and the President of Georgia
and the last Foreign Minister of the former USSR, Eduard
Shevardnadze, during one of those visits was especially revealing.
The Georgian leader affirmed that the West, when negotiating
the unification of Germany in the late 1980s, made no promise
not to enlarge NATO east of Germany. NATO was enlarged
when the former German Democratic Republic transformed
into NATO territory. What was agreed upon was that NATO's
enlargement to East Germany would be militarily limited, for ex-
ample, non-deployment of nuclear weapons, similar to a cur-
rently envisaged enlargement into Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. 20 The Russian Government often employs a misinter-
preted version of this alleged promise. A neutral observer must
carefully weigh all of Russia's arguments, not just in terms of
their compatibility with common sense but, more difficultly, with
hard facts.
Russia's arguments regarding the Baltic States lack logic, if
juxtaposed against Russia's general position against enlargement
which, in some instances, may make sense. In fact, Russia does
not provide any arguments for its stance which can be reason-
ably approached in an open discussion. This was exemplified
when Russia loosened its tough stand on the NATO membership
of most of the Visegrad states.2 1 The Russian negotiating team
reiterated its inflexible dissent to NATO over the possibility of
NATO seizing the military infrastructure that the Soviet army
built in the Baltic States. 22 This call was conceded by U.S. Presi-
dent Bill Clinton at the Helsinki Summit, 23 appeared in the Joint
to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to operations, to develop military
relations with NATO, and to promote long-term development of interoperability with
NATO forces. Id. (citing NATO Partnership For Peace 1 (NATO, 1994)).
20. Michael R. Gordon, The Anatomy of a Misunderstanding, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
1997, at 3.
21. See Melchior Wathelet, The Case Law of the European Court ofJustice and Nationals
of Non-European Community Member States, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 603, 611 (1997) (dis-
cussing Visegrad agreements between Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia).
22. Michael R. Gordon, Russia Accepts Eastward Growth of NATO, but Only Inch by
Inch, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1997, at Al.
23. Russia-United States: Joint Statements Concerning Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,
Chemical Weapons, Cooperative Economic Initiative, European Security, and Parame-
ters of Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, 36 I.L.M. 1025 (1997).
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Statement on European Security24 by the two presidents, and
later was incorporated into the Founding Act on Mutual Rela-
tions, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian
Federation,25 signed in Paris, in May 1997. In that act, NATO
agreed to replace the concept of permanent deployment on the
territories of new members with a clause of rapid reinforcement
in cases of crisis. For that, Russia gave its consent to the develop-
ment of an infrastructure in new NATO members to ensure nec-
essary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforce-
ment.
Ironically, Russia left the bases in Lithuania so run-down
that they would hardly fit strict NATO requirements. Lithuania
had to invest significantly to restructure and rebuild them. This
explanation cannot be taken seriously, apart from the absence of
other explanations why for Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary it is "maybe," and for the Baltics it is "definitely no."
Russia's complaints about being pushed out of Central Europe
pose the question of whether the Russian Government pictures
itself virtually present there now.
Russia's method of preventing the Baltic States' member-
ship in NATO is similar to that used when the Baltic States
sought their independence. Russia threatened that, in order for
the Baltics to leave, they had to win a decision by all of the USSR
republics in support of their secession, because secession af-
fected the entire republic. Through such demands, Russia
demonstrated that its understanding of the very concept of sov-
ereignty was incompatible with that of other democratic coun-
tries, not to mention the incongruence of this concept when ap-
plied to the USSR's forced annexation of the Baltic States in
1945 in the first place. Fortunately, this argument lacked com-
mon sense all too evidently and did not ultimately prevent the
dissolution of the USSR. Today it is Russia who downgrades the
24. Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on European Security, 36 I.L.M. 1033 (1997).
25. Treaty on the Formation of the Community of Belarus and Russia [Russian
Federation], done at Moscow, April 2, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1190 (1996).
The treaty addresses economic ("the unification of monetary, credit and budg-
etary systems"), social ("equal rights of the Parties' citizens to receive an edu-
cation, find work, receive pay or be granted other social guarantees"), and
institutional (a Supreme Council to act by consensus, a Parliamentary Assem-
bly to adopt model acts by qualified majority, and an Executive Committee)
regional cooperation.
Marsha A. Echols, Regional Economic Integration, 31 INT'L LAw. 453, 462 n.8 (1997).
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sovereign right of the Baltic States to seek membership in
NATO. If this somehow affects Russia's interests it must be dis-
cussed rather than Russia using total resistance and political
blackmailing. Lithuanian leaders have always emphasized the
need to seek appropriate international arrangements which
would facilitate Russia's involvement in European affairs in or-
der to conduct an open discussion among equal partners.
One can only wish that the vigor with which Russia attempts
to compromise the aspiration of the Baltic States would be di-
rected to its internal reforms. The best evidence is Russia's fury
addressed at Estonia and Latvia regarding minority issues. While
there are some problems with integrating minorities in these two
Baltic States, they pale by comparison to those faced to the south
of Russia, for example, in Tajikistan, or in the Russian Federa-
tion itself, as in Chechnya. Russia did everything to make the
Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia a hurdle to those Baltic
States' aspiration for NATO membership in the West's eyes.26
Studies of the RAND corporation27 have already mentioned the
presence of the huge Russian minorities in the Baltic States as a
major cause of Allied unwillingness to commit to defending the
Baltic States under the NATO umbrella. Lithuania, however,
only has a fully integrated Russian minority of 8.3% of the entire
population.
Russia's reliance on the "minority card" is evident in its
most senior level long-term policy statements on the Baltics.
The Washington-based journalist and scholar Paul Goble noted,
"while the statement claims that Moscow 'seeks to fully realize
the potential of good neighborliness' between Russia and the
Baltic States, few people in both the Baltic countries and the
West will see Yeltsin's statement as pointing in that direction."2"
The strategy mainly concentrates on minority issues not applica-
26. The important factor is not the percentage but the actual integration of minor-
ides. The assumption here is that the situation of Russian minorities in Tajikistan, or
other ethnic groups in Russia itself, such as Chechens, is much worse than that of Esto-
nia or Latvia. In any case, 8.3% of Lithuania's population is Polish, 7% is Russian, and
4% is comprised of many other ethnic minorities. In Latvia and Estonia, Russian minor-
ides compose roughly 35% and 45% of the total population, respectively.
27. See Norwood S. Wilner, A Smoker's Victory: Carter v. Brown and Williamson, 44
FED. LAW. 33, 35 (1997) (describing RAND Corporation as free world's premier think
tank).
28. Paul Goble, Russia: Analysis from Washington-Putting Pressure on the Baltics, Feb.
14, 1997 (RFE/RL).
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ble to, but still affecting Lithuania. Although the policy must be
regarded as a mere tactical move with the aim of intimidating
those who will influence the decisions to enlarge NATO, there
are some worrying signs in its content. It hints about Russian
opposition to Baltic membership in the Western European
Union2" ("WEU" or "Western European Union"), a European
version of NATO comprised of ten members. Russia previously
did not regard the Western European Union as a threat. This
poses some somber thoughts, as the role of the Western Euro-
pean Union in European security is still undecided. With its
growing appetite for obstruction, it can only be anticipated that
Russia would use the same arguments against Baltic entry into
the European Union after an announcement of their exclusion
from NATO. In doing so, Russia might not make its views dejure,
but would incorporate its position through concrete actions.
Another Russian tactic to block the Baltic States' entry into
NATO is the delay of settlement of border disputes. Because
NATO membership requires candidates to have border agree-
ments between themselves and their neighbors, Russia appears
to hold a very strong card on this issue. One could further pre-
sume that the economy is likely to be seen as another means of
pressure with the aim of satellitization or "Finlandization." To-
day, banks are more powerful weapons than tanks. Such a
stance seems to only further isolate Russia and cloud its future,
rather than damage the Baltics' chance to join NATO.
Despite these tactics, Lithuania has good and stable rela-
tions with all neighbors. The most recent heightening of already
strong relations with Poland shows that the two countries have
formed a strategic partnership based on a mutual understanding
of Europe's security, stability, and prosperity, as well as the
means for achieving them. Lithuania's relations with the Rus-
sian Federation are also friendly and neighborly. The only sig-
nificant difference is in their views on NATO enlargement.
Another chronic athough refutable Russian claim is that by
29. See Davis Brown, The Role of Regional Organizations in Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F.
L. REv. 235, 245 (1997). The Western European Union ("WEU") was the result of a
political movement to strengthen European integration within NATO, and is a spin off
of the arrangement created in the Brussels Treaty. Id. The WEU was created by the
1954 Paris Protocol. Id. The WEU's role in the Inter-European system is subservient to
NATO, however, it is also the defense component under the European Union. Id. at
246.
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expanding eastward, NATO is shamefully taking advantage of
Russia's weakness. It is not NATO's eastward expansion which is
driving this process, rather, it is the desire of the Baltic States,
Poland, and other countries long dominated by Russia to go
westward. Most analysts foresee that Russia's internal problems,
including a stumbling economy, democratic reforms, internal in-
stabilities, and unpaid troops and workers, will take decades, if
not much of the next century to solve. Is it reasonable, there-
fore, that Russia's own inability to turn itself around should give
it yet another veto on the sovereign decisions of the Baltic coun-
tries? Is it not this same instability, and the likelihood of it spill-
ing over into Central and Eastern Europe, that is a legitimate
reason for expanding the NATO umbrella?
The aspiration of the Baltic States to become NATO mem-
bers is raised at nearly every meeting between Russian and Allied
officials. These discussions are highly relevant to the Baltic
States, as they concern their vital interests. Whatever Russia's
tactics are, the Baltics deserve to be involved in these discussions.
Professor Landsbergis, during his visit to Warsaw in February
1997, emphasized that the Baltic States must make sure that
when Russia talks with the West, it talks with Baltic States rather
than about Baltic States. The Baltic States also appeal to the
West for transparency of discussions which affect the Baltic
States' security.
4. Russia's Misperception
Everyone who disagrees with Russian officials and opinion-
makers is likely to be astonished about the perception, or rather,
misperception of the reality in Europe. U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright once concluded that "the NATO Russia
claims to oppose bears little resemblance to the alliance we are
actually building. NATO does not need an enemy. It has endur-
ing purposes.""° During the February 18, 1997 NATO ministe-
rial meeting in Brussels, she clearly underlined that NATO no
longer is arrayed in opposition to any one enemy. President of
the Czech Republic Vaclav Havel likes to repeat that in the Cold
War the threat to NATO "was not dangerous because it was Rus-
sian. It was dangerous because it was Communist and totalitar-
30. Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger is Better, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 21, 22.
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It is doubtful that these arguments are taken into considera-
tion by those who design strategies for NATO. Russian interests
and concerns must be respected, however, considering the
amount of influence this country has on European security. It
does not logically follow, however, that the size of a country di-
rectly corresponds to the degree of legitimacy and importance of
its desires. Russia's fear of NATO is largely its own problem. As
the cartoon character Pogo once lampooned the internal weak-
nesses of the United States, stating "[w] e have met the enemy
and it is us," similarly, Russia is its own enemy. The West must
do its utmost to correct the distorted image of NATO in Russia.
It is obvious, however, that the main responsibility for this assign-
ment lays with the Russian Government itself.
Supporters of NATO enlargement question why expansion
should be held hostage to the ignorance of the Russian people
and the connivery of Russian politicians who, too often, seek to
bamboozle their own people with imaginary foreign enemies for
short term, domestic, political gains. It has been stated:
[it] is an issue of perception, of political sensitivities, not one
of military reality .... [Enlargement] has become a target of
convenience for Russian fears and resentments rooted in un-
certainties over Russia's post-Soviet identity and role in the
world .... This is not to dismiss the importance of percep-
tions as a factor in politics and diplomacy. But those Russians
who are currently lashing out against an anachronistic stereo-
types of NATO [what Talbott called "Alarmism"] have it
within their power to bring perceptions more in line with re-
ality.3 2
Even respected Russian leaders are not above such games.
For example, in a Russian television appearance on February 16,
1997, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgeny Primakov, the-
atrically asked who NATO is against, if alliances are always
against someone. China? Iran? Such rhetoric is almost too easy
to counter. For example, the Western European Union is also a
collective defense alliance. Who does it oppose? Who does the
European Union oppose? More relevantly, the CIS, of which
Russia is the chief architect, and the creation of which has not
31. Vaclav Havel, NATO's Quality of Life, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1997, at A21.
32. Strobe Talb6tt, Russia Has Nothing to Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997, at A19.
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been objected to by the international community, also has an
arrangement for collective defense, but against whom? Is the
CIS common defense "NATO's enemy?" If the logic of the Rus-
sian arguments against NATO enlargement is followed, the CIS
then poses a grave danger to Europe. In the Lithuanian logic,
CIS is not a threat but rather a benign commonwealth of sover-
eign states. It is hard, therefore, for a Lithuanian politician, a
diplomat, or an ordinary citizen to understand why Russian offi-
cials see no possibility of a peaceful and mutually beneficial co-
existence of NATO and Russia.
5. Winds of Change: An Indication of Russian Reform-Minded
Political Support of NATO
NATO's image was significantly improved by the signature
of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Se-
curity33 (the "Founding Act") between NATO and the Russian
Federation in Paris, on May 27, 1997. In the Founding Act's pre-
amble, NATO and Russia denounced that each see an adversary
in the other. In the Founding Act, NATO repeatedly pledged to
amend its strategic doctrine of 1991 and strike Russia off the list
of top threats, again demonstrating its willingness to reform.
Unfortunately, the image of a malicious NATO is now rooted in,
if not designed by, official Russian minds and yesterday's leaders.
The indecisiveness of the West in enlarging NATO in the first
place has made Russia question whether NATO enlargement
may cause damage to Russia. Even those Western politicians
who argue that the Baltic States are indefensible admit by this
that a potential aggressor does exist. The Czech President
Vaclav Havel warned that "[t] he subtle, instinctive transfer of the
old way of thinking into the present is perhaps even more dan-
gerous than the endurance of the clearly anachronistic idea of
two powerful systems." 4 He even applied that label on NATO
itself, stating that "[i]f old thinking prevails, it will turn alliance
into a hopelessly antiquated club of Cold War veterans."3 5 Conse-
quently, a ghost image of NATO is an easy scheme to depict.
With all of this fog being spread around the issue, it is as-
33. The NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Secur-
ity, 36 I.L.M. 1006 (1997) [hereinafter Founding Act].
34. Vaclav Havel, NATO's Quality of Life, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1997, at A21.
35. Id.
NATO ENLARGEMENT
tounding that some Russian reform-minded politicians actually
see it clearly. Political leaders and opinion-makers like the re-
form-minded Grigori Yavlinski or Kozyrev see no threat in
NATO. It is natural, therefore, that the West identifies the pro-
NATO forces as reform-oriented. Kozyrev himself sees the
NATO enlargement as a crucial battle for democracy in Russia
and calls on the West not merely to watch this battle from aside
and to wait for a winner that deserves to be heard in the West.
Even Russian National Security Advisor and retired General Al-
exander Lebed has argued both ways, but his stand is not uncon-
ditionally stiff.
By the same token, the results of the public opinion poll in
Russia on Lithuania's membership in NATO conducted in
March 1997 by the Moscow-based Center of International Socio-
logical Investigations revealed striking facts. It showed that
70.4% of the respondents believe that this is Lithuania's own in-
ternal affair, 59% were of the opinion that assigning to Lithua-
nia a function of a buffer zone is a bad idea, and only 22%
thought that extension of NATO to Lithuania would worsen
Lithuanian-Russian relations. The previously claimed unanimity
of Russian people in opposition to NATO enlargement thus be-
comes less credible. This public persuasion works best on its au-
thors rather than widely targeted groups.
C. Kaliningrad: Europe's Headache, or Hidden Asset?
The issue of the Kaliningrad district has been on the agenda
of various international security fora. Kaliningrad is a small Rus-
sian administrative district commonly referred to as "Oblast," lo-
cated on the Baltic Sea coast between Lithuanian and Poland. It
is an area of high sensitivity, because of the many battles fought
there during World War II. Its final legal status was never deter-
mined during the post-war peace conference, thus, leaving the
notion of "unfinished history" alive. Today it is Russia's western-
most military outpost. With the universal adherence to the prin-
ciples of inviolability of borders, the historical feature of the dis-
trict is rapidly declining. No government in Europe is likely to
be in a position to challenge the rights of Russia over this land,
however unjust its history may have been. The strategic value of
Kaliningrad has been involved in an increasingly high-stakes de-
liberations. The enlargement of NATO is likely to prompt a cul-
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mination of defense analysts' activities attempting to assess the
impact of the district's existence in the future NATO territory
which will be close to, border, or possibly even encircle the dis-
trict.
Indeed, there have already been attempts to launch such
analyses by respectable institutions, including the RAND corpo-
ration. One could hardly, if at all, find a beneficial purpose of
this territory for European security. Today it only serves as a
base for an exaggerated concentration of Russian conventional
weaponry, wholly disproportional to that of almost any other
place in Europe. If asked about the threat which is supposed to
explain the military concentration levels, Russian military offi-
cials are unlikely to point to one right away. Rather, the first
explanation they normally offer is lack of resources to relocate
the forces from Kaliningrad. Russian officials either implicitly
hint or explicitly state that Kaliningrad could serve as a means to
slow down or even stop NATO expansion, demonstrating mili-
tary analysts' deliberations about NATO enlargement.
Russia's determination to maintain an enhanced force
strength in Kaliningrad, regardless of the status of its relations
with NATO, indicates that it never intended to lower its military
presence there. Russia's financial arguments do seem credible,
but the Western fear of Kaliningrad's perceived military might
was the best incentive for Russia to develop Kaliningrad's factor
by simultaneously targeting two crucial economic and military'
aims. Russia first argued that removing the army from the dis-
trict would be cost prohibitive. Russia then used its presence as
an iron fist to wave before the NATO's nose. These tactics play
into hands of the opposition to NATO enlargement process.
There is sufficient ground to doubt the sincerity of those in the
West who also use the situation in Kaliningrad to slow or stop the
process.
Lithuania views the Kaliningrad district from a different per-
spective. Those who see Russia as a future economic power, with
its rich natural resources and large markets, pray for a common
border with it. Today, the only border shared between Lithua-
nia, Poland, and Russia is in Kaliningrad. It is its economic,
rather than its military significance, that makes Kaliningrad im-
portant for Russia. It is the only ice-free Russian sea port on the
Baltic sea coast and the closest shortcut to the West from the
hinterland rich in resources. The area has fertile soils and unex-
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plored deposits of oil. The Russian Government has been keen
to present the district to foreign investors and even introduced
significant tax exemptions, such as an exemption from the profit
tax enjoyed by foreign capital firms for several years from the
start of their operation. Lithuanian leaders have been forthcom-
ing to these initiatives. Today, we have facilitated a trade visa-
free-regime between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad district.
Contacts between the Lithuanian Government, local authorities,
businesses, and cultural institutions have increased so that there
is a new understanding between the people of Kaliningrad and
Lithuania.
Poland, which developed similar relations with Kaliningrad,
apparently shares the Lithuanian approach. The latest develop-
ment has been one of trans-frontier cooperation. The Kalinin-
grad district administration, together with local bordering au-
thorities of Lithuania, Poland, and Belarus, launched the project
of the Nemunas (Neman) Euroregion. This project aims at co-
operation between the bordering local authorities in areas such
as civil protection, small and medium-sized businesses, educa-
tion, cultural links, transportation, and cross-border movement
of people. This international regional entity is based on the ex-
isting practice of vast trans-frontier cooperation, first started by
the European Union, and later introduced in many other re-
gions of Europe. Lithuania has been deliberately involving the
Kaliningrad district in international cooperation. Although the
willing Kaliningrad authorities have not joined the project yet,
the explanation for that has been the absence of permission
from Moscow. Kaliningrad's involvement in the project seems to
be only a matter of time-consuming bureaucracy in the Krem-
lin's long corridors.
The Lithuanian policy demonstrated that there are ways to
accommodate Russia's military interests in Kaliningrad. Russia
conducts its military transit to and from Kaliningrad district
through the territory of Lithuania. The transit is governed by
the rules unilaterally adopted by Lithuania and accepted by the
Russian Government. This procedure has existed for more than
three years with no unsolved disputes. Lithuania retains the sov-
ereign right to cancel permission for transit rules but no such
plans have been deliberated. Had Lithuania disagreed to grant
the transit, the only option for Moscow would have been seaways
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along the Baltic sea, or airways, as Poland would most certainly
not grant that right in the case of refusal by Lithuania.
The understanding between Lithuania and Russia of the
Kaliningrad district's strategic importance to Russia guaranteed
smooth conduct of military transit. Although such a policy was
adopted partly owing to the pressure from the West, Lithuania
recognizes the legitimacy of some of Russia's interests. If it be-
comes clear that the Russian military transit to Kaliningrad is an
obstacle for Lithuania to join NATO, however, it is very likely
that Lithuania's foreign policy priorities, one of which is NATO
membership, will then prevail.
Lithuania, Kaliningrad, and Poland can be seen as a single
geopolitical unit with its own, unique needs. Thus, relations
among the three parts of the unit are such that any decisions
that would affect one part will affect the other parts as well. If
the NATO enlargement process leads Russia to conclude that
Lithuania is not to be included, Lithuania will be facing tremen-
dous pressure and responsibility for satisfying Russian military
interests in Kaliningrad, including transit. There will, conse-
quently, be a great danger of instability in the region. It will
virtually be the West's decision which will determine the future
role of Kaliningrad in European stability, rather than Russia's
decision. It is up to the West to decide whether it wants Kalinin-
grad as a headache for another decade to come, or as a regional
asset with vast economic opportunities.
D. America's Efforts to Increase Russian Global Political Presence
In Helsinki, President Clinton happened to be in possession
of additional means, wanted by President Yeltsin, for NATO en-
largement. Both leaders reiterated their determination to be-
come original state-parties to the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion" before it entered into force on April 29, 1997, yet only the
United States lived up to this commitment. This was, however,
an important political statement by the leaders of the two major
possessors of chemical weapons stocks, especially on behalf of
the Russians.
In order to upgrade Russia's political stance in global poli-
tics and economics, President Clinton promised President Yelt-
36. The U.N. Chemical Weapons Convention, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993).
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sin that he would press for greater Russian involvement in the
Group of Seven 37 ("G-7"), the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development 8 ("OECD"), the World Trade Organi-
zation 39 ("WTO"), and some other exclusive economic fora.
Given the urrent condition of the Russian economy, which is
today a mere twentieth of that of the U.S. economy and equal to
the performance of the considerably smaller South Korea, it is
difficult to comprehend in what ways Russia could contribute to,
or formally qualify for, membership in these institutions. One
should also be anticipating harsh pressure from China to follow
the precedent of expanding G-7 to G-8. Admittedly, President
Clinton did not explicitly offer membership in G-7, but rather to
substantially increase Russia's role, beginning from the next an-
nual meeting of the seven global leaders, and to call the summit
held in Denver, on June 20-21, 1997, G-8. As for WTO or OECD,
Yeltsin could expect success in pressing for real membership.
Russia has been offered additional cash in blunt terms as
well. Clinton promised an increase in direct assistance to Russia
as well as support from American investors. It is a commendable
step as long as it is a move that heavily pushes Russia towards
democracy and a free economy.
Above all, no country in Europe will appreciate concessions
to Russia if such concessions do not benefit everyone's security.
The current slogan "Security for Russia" must never transform
into "Russia First." Professor Landsbergis assertively pointed out
that security for all must emphasize the protection of smaller
and more vulnerable states, and must prevent bigger, more pow-
erful states from abusing their bargaining positions, much like
Russia did when bargaining with NATO.
II. The Price of NATO Enlargerment
Having identified Russian concerns about NATO enlarge-
ment and discussing their legitimacy, it is worthwhile to deter-
mine a reasonable price, other than that of internal adaptation
37. The Group of Seven ("G-7") is comprised of the United States, Japan, the
United Kingdom, France, Canada, Italy, and Germany. When Russia is in attendance, it
is sometimes referred to as G-8.
38. G-7 is a Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, formerly known as G-24, now having 27 member-states.
39. Geneva-based, World Trade Organization, formerly known as General Agree-
ment on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT").
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of NATO after enlargement to bring new members up to NATO
standards, that could be offered against reasonable opposition.
Deliberations about this crucial question seek to establish a re-
gional balance of power. Such an arrangement should seek to
foster regional stability and strengthen the political framework
of pan-European consultations by increasing the transparency of
discussions between Russia and western political and security
structures. In terms of balance of power, the two crucial factors
that politicians and analysts most frequently ponder are conven-
tional forces, the deployment of which the Treaty on Conven-
tional Forces in Europe4 ° ("CFE") largely determines, and strate-
gic/tactical weapons. In terms of political consultations, the bar-
gaining was crowned with the establishment of the NATO-Russia
PermanentJoint Council.41 The Helsinki Summit, regarded as a
meeting of revisiting powers' bilateral commitments, also
showed that "basket of carrots, which could be offered to the
anti-NATO opposition is far from being depleted.
A. Political Mechanisms For Cooperation and Consultation
Worried about losing its influence over the developments in
European security, Russia wanted to be involved, through a le-
gally binding agreement, in an effective and influential arrange-
ment for political and military consultations. It has tried to ac-
complish this through attempts at a legally binding charter on
European security, the proposal of a NATO-Russian agreement,
and the establishment of a NATO-Russian Permanent Joint
Council.
1. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Russia has been pursuing the policy of upgrading the role
of the OSCE42 with the intention of giving this institution a man-
date overriding NATO's authority. The consensus procedures
40. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1
(1991) [hereinafter CFE Treaty]. A goal of the CFE Treaty is to "enhance stability by
ending force disparities and limit the capability for launching surprise attack on initiat-
ing large-scale, sustained, offensive action in Europe." Jenkins, supra note 4, at 1922
n.6. The CFE Treaty sets ceilings from the Atlantic to Urals on key armaments essential
for conducting surprise attack and initiating large scale offensive operations. Id.
41. The NATO-Russia PermanentJoint Council, 36 I.L.M. 1006, 1010 (1997).
42. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE Lisbon Docu-
ment of 1996, 36 I.L.M. 486 (1997) [hereinafter OSCE].
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required in the OSCE make this change unlikely. Subsequent
Russian efforts were addressed in a legally binding charter on
European security, which would somehow prevail over the North
Atlantic Treaty. While this attempt was supported by French
leadership, however, the French did not specify its vision of such
a charter's hierarchy in the European security system. A legally
binding character of any pan-European agreement, dealing with
the broadest security aspects, turned out to be unacceptable for
most of Western and Central Europe. Mere political commit-
ments, as suggested by the many nations that were opposed to a
legal treaty, did not satisfy Russia.
2. U.S.-Russian Joint Statement on European Security
Russia then proposed a NATO-Russian agreement with the
purpose of setting up a standing bilateral institution for consul-
tation and cooperation. NATO did not reject it. The Joint State-
ment on European Security43 of the U.S. and Russian Presidents,
issued after their Summit on March 21, 1997, in Finland, foresaw
that the NATO-Russian agreement would be signed by the high-
est political leaders of the NATO member-states and Russia.
Before the talks between Russia and NATO began, Russian
President Boris Yeltsin insisted that a legally binding agreement
come before NATO enlargement. At that point, both NATO
member-states and aspiring members were cautious about this
tactic, fearing that Moscow envisioned an agreement which
would effectively block NATO enlargement. Russia wanted
agreements with individual NATO member-states in order to ne-
gotiate possibly different provisions with each of them, some tak-
ing more account of Russian demands, some taking less. Indi-
vidual agreements would take more time thus delaying the pro-
cess of NATO enlargement, or at least trying to win Russia's
consent to it. NATO accepted neither a legally binding agree-
ment nor their multiplicity.
3. The Founding Act and the NATO-Russian Permanent
Joint Council
The Founding Act' ("Founding Act") was signed by the
heads of Russia and NATO member-states in Paris on May 27,
43. Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on European Security, 36 I.L.M. 1033 (1997).
44. Founding Act, supra note 33, 36 I.L.M. 1006 (1997).
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1997. The Founding Act achieved its main purpose, namely to
lay grounds for the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
("Council"). The Council is mandated with issues that are al-
ready covered by OSCE and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Coun-
cil.4" The only difference that mattered for Russia is having a
private table with NATO for all those issues, without "biased"
NATO aspirants. Yeltsin celebrated a tactical victory since the
Founding Act came before Madrid Summit on July 8-9, 1997.
Many greeted the Founding Act warmly, because it repeated the
same OSCE principles of interstate relations, including the
states' "inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own
security," and established a relatively neutral Russia-NATO con-
sultation mechanism.
In the course of negotiating the Founding Act, U.S. Secre-
tary of State Talbott described the purpose of the process as an
attempt to avoid errors that were made at the end of both World
Wars, such as the punitive measures of Versailles and the permis-
sive measures of Yalta.46 At the founding ceremony, its host,
French PresidentJacques Chirac contemplated that "built on the
ruins of World War II, the order that came out of Yalta led to
peace that was unfair, preserved by the balance of terror," or
what Havel calls the lasting fight between Europe's two still col-
liding forces "tribal passions and civic principles."47 Chirac also
noted that the Founding Act ended half a century of misunder-
standing, confrontation, and division, and that Europe had at
last reconciled with itself. A similar sentiment was echoed by al-
most all European leaders.
The crucial question is how loud the Russian voice will be in
the Council. Some international personalities voiced their reser-
vations about the Council. Nearly all of those doubts can be
found in the thoughts expressed by Friedbert Pfluger, a member
of the foreign affairs committee in the German Parliament.
Fearing that the Council is "a backdoor way for Russia into
45. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is an outcome of the merger between
the PFP and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council ("NACC"). The NACC is a forum
in which Allies can offer their experience and expert advice to partner countries on
security issues. S. TREATY Doc. No. 25, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at V-VII (1994).
46. R.W. Apple Jr., NATO Expansion: Rocky Road to Approval for Risky Gamble, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1997, at Al.
47. Barry Bearak, Havel Wants NATO to Welcome Democracies, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
1997, at Al8.
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NATO,' '48 he suspects that, "with the creation of the new council,
Moscow will be included in NATO decisions at least a year and
half earlier than the candidates for membership." 49 "Even
though Russia will formally lack the power to block any NATO
action, the alliance will feel obliged to consult Kremlin first...
the pressure for reaching consensus will be great. . . Russia will
possess not de jure, but de facto veto." ° He was also dissatisfied
that, during negotiations, "Russia was not asked to concede on
its tactical weaponry in Kaliningrad ... where Russia has a very
big advantage in tactical nuclear weapons. "51 Responding to
fears from NATO aspirants about Russia's power to block NATO
enlargement through the Council, Pfluger wrote that reducing
the anxieties of Central and Eastern European countries is a pre-
condition for a real partnership with Moscow.
Although Moscow interprets its mandate differently from
other signatories and deems that the Council is also eligible to
discuss NATO enlargement as an issue of common interest re-
lated to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO
reserved the right of independent decision-making on issues
which Russia would disapprove and/or are NATO's internal is-
sues. Enlargement is obviously one of those issues, and it will
most likely be absent from the Council's agenda, the adoption of
which requires consensus. Havel, although referring to the gen-
eral assumption of Russia never becoming a part of NATO, said
that "it is hard to imagine it [Russia] could become an intrinsic
part of NATO without flooding the alliance with the busy agenda
of Russian interests."52 This fear equally applies to the Council's
operation.
Another merit of the Council is that it does not offer Russia
a wider menu of topics than the aspirants now have themselves.
Yet if, in the course of the Council's growth, this would appear to
be true, it would paradoxically mean that Russia confronting
NATO would pay off better than aspirant's more cooperative at-
titudes. For the time-being, Pfluger's and others' fears can be
relatively quieted.
Certain facts were leaked to the public about the NATO-




52. Vaclav Havel, NATO's Quality of Life, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, at A21.
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Russian negotiation on the Founding Act and, in particular, with
regard to the number of deployable NATO troops in new mem-
bers' territories. It is somewhat alarming that, before Russia
dropped its demands to limit the deployment of Allies' troops in
new members to five percent of all troops present in the country,
the West conceded to twenty percent. 53 Eventually the figures
were abandoned, but the NATO's acquiescence to a very low
number of twenty percent gives an approximate idea about the
Alliance's understanding of mutual reinforcement arrange-
ments. In any case, numbers could come up at negotiations for
future waves of enlargement, and, once conceded, the twenty
percent would doubtfully go up. If so, this could seriously un-
dermine the guaranties NATO seeks to extend eastwards and
would even pose a risk of creating a second category of member-
ship. Based on a scrutiny of the birth of the Founding Act and
the Council, the idea of a pan-European charter on European
security is unlikely to be pursued vigorously until the first wave of
enlargement regresses. After the Madrid Summit, the bid for a
charter might increase and become of special relevance to subse-
quent waves of NATO enlargement.
B. The CFE Treaty, NATO Military Forces, and NATO Enlargement
The CFE Treaty, which was agreed to during the Cold War,
established "zone limits" as the modality for the balancing of
forces. Modifications to the CFE Treaty are, by far, the major
price paid to Russia for NATO enlargement. Russia's main con-
cern is that the positioning eastward of NATO forces which
would result from accession of Central and Eastern European
countries would pose a threat to Russia's security. Although Rus-
sia would obviously prefer that NATO forces not be positioned
eastwards at all, Russia could not reject consideration of compro-
mise proposals to adapt the CFE Treaty off-hand. At the Hel-
sinki Summit on February 20-21, 1997, President Clinton admit-
ted that there is no current need to deploy NATO forces on the
land of NATO newcomers in a foreseeable future, but he refused
to make a perpetual non-deployment promise. Later, as was
mentioned under the Founding Act, NATO took into account
Russia's demands not to deploy conventional forces on the terri-
53. Michael R. Gordon, Decision for NATO: The Overview; Russia Agrees to NATO Plan
Pushed by Clinton to Admit Nations From Eastern Bloc, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1997, at Al.
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tories of new NATO members, but refused to give up its military
infrastructure which could be used for rapid conventional rein-
forcements in critical situations. It is unfortunate that the CFE
Treaty adjustments made during the May 1996 Review Confer-
ence, which allowed Russia to keep higher levels of conventional
weaponry in the flanks east of the Baltic States and north of Cau-
casus, were conceded to Russia without a linkage to NATO en-
largement. Not only were these negotiations conducted
clandestinely without the transparency which would have ena-
bled the non-CFE Treaty states affected by these decisions to
voice their concerns, but they also resulted in a wasteful one-way
concession by the West.
The first publicly known move by the West was a proposal
brought to Kremlin by the U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Al-
bright on February 20, 1997. She proposed to lower the ceilings
set by the CFE Treaty for current and aspiring members of
NATO who are also parties to CFE Treaty. The strength of the
move is both its relevance to NATO enlargement and, more
broadly, its contribution to the overall conventional disarma-
ment in Europe, a goal which Lithuania wholeheartedly sup-
ports.
NATO and Russia agreed to adopt the CFE Treaty, but this
time the principle of transparency seems to have reigned. The
signatories recognized the importance of the adaptation of the
CFE for the broader context of security in the OSCE area, as well
as the legitimate security interests of all OSCE participating
States, not only CFE Treaty States-Parties. During negotiations
on the CFE Treaty, however, this very same Founding Act calls
for restraints from the States-Parties to the CFE Treaty to avoid
diminishing the security of any State-Party, not of any OSCE
states. Despite these ambiguities, the Founding Act agreed to
permit the possible accession by new States Parties.
Conceptual discussions about modifications of the CFE
Treaty inevitably focus on alternatives to the existing structure of
control moving from "zone limits" to national force levels. A
state-by-state, national approach would reflect the new political
realities in Europe, the limits coinciding with state borders, and
would significantly contribute to the elimination of the notion of
opposing military blocks. Furthermore, lower national ceilings,
if combined with sufficient limits for an outside assistance in
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cases of crisis, would emphasize the cooperative spirit of the ar-
rangement.
New NATO members could increase the legally allowed ca-
pacity of NATO to supplement their conventional forces. Ironi-
cally, Poland's 2000 tanks already outnumber American tanks
presently stationed in Europe, although the latter are far supe-
rior. The fundamental assumption in all these deliberations is
that, in the case of a hypothetical conflict between NATO and
any outside adversary, the aspirant member-states will fight on
the side of NATO anyway. Therefore, Russia should not demand
unrealistic restraints on NATO conventional forces because they
would not change the political and military reality.
Lithuania will not accept the lengthy process of further re-
ductions of the CFE Treaty, even in her surrounding area, as a
legitimate argument for delayed NATO membership. Today, no
country exceeds the limits set by the Treaty on Limited Equip-
ment54 ("TLE"), therefore, new limits will not really perform a
function of constraint but rather will be an adaptation of the
limits to new realities of a lesser need to rely on conventional
forces. The West could agree to lower weapon allotment under
the CFE treaty without actually cutting their forces as the actual
deployment is already considerably lower than the TLE ceilings
allow. A move in this direction was agreed upon by U.S. Presi-
dent Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin, apart from the hand-
shake about freezing the ceilings for the Central Europe. The
general merit of such adaptation would be an incentive, accord-
ing to a still undefined time-schedule, to require further reduc-
tions in conventional weapons.
C. The Nuclear Bargaining Chip
New agreements on strategic nuclear weapons are also be-
ing considered in the NATO enlargement debate. The value of
nuclear weapons in this bargain is predetermined by the deterio-
ration of Russia's conventional forces while the nuclear power
has hardly diminished. The long declared policy of no-first-use
in the 1980s was gradually denounced in the 1990s in favor of
Russian military doctrines which contemplated a nuclear retalia-
tion against conventional attack.
54. At least no violations of the CFE Treaty have been detected by the verification
missions.
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The likelihood that NATO's nuclear ghost, which has al-
ready been abruptly slashed since the Cold War, would come
closer to the former USSR's borders. This caused concern for
NATO opponents not only in Russia but also in Ukraine, Be-
larus, and Kazakhstan, all of which have become nuclear
weapon-free states by giving up their nuclear arsenals to Russia.
Ukraine and Belarus have been active proponents of the idea of
a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. The
idea, however, has not received much support, mostly owing to
the fear of NATO aspirants to assume pre-commitments that
might jeopardize their eligibility for membership.
The initiative came from NATO, first, in the Berlin Ministe-
rial meeting on December 10, 1996, and then in the Founding
Act. Such initiative pledged, albeit with no legal commitment,
not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of new NATO
members and not to establish new nuclear storage sites or use
old ones. The explanation for this move is a generally under-
stood absence of the need of greater stationing of nuclear weap-
ons around Europe. NATO, at least under the present circum-
stances, affirms that it has neither plans nor intentions to do so.
Lithuanian officials support this position. Article 137 of the
Lithuanian Constitution a priori prohibits deployment of weap-
ons of mass destruction on its territory. Theoretically, however,
this clause could be amended as the constitutional article on
land purchase and ownership, which impeded signing the Asso-
ciation Agreement with the European Union, was amended.55
As with conventional forces, the West has plunged in the
revision of existing commitments on strategic nuclear forces as
part of its NATO enlargement strategy. The treaty between the
United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction and limita-
tion of strategic offensive arms56 ("START I"), signed on July 31,
1991, is a remnant of the recent past, and is the most important
present bilateral commitment between the United States and
55. Previously prohibitive, Article 47 of the Lithuanian Constitution now allows,
under certain conditions, land ownership by foreign citizens. This amendment allowed
the Association Agreement to be compatible with the Lithuanian Constitution. The
Lithuanian Constitution was established in 1992, and Article 47 was amended in 1996.
56. START I Treaty, 31 I.L.M. 246 (1992). The Protocol to the Start I Treaty is
located at 31 I.L.M. 1600 (1992).
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Russia. The follow-up, START II," is half-completed. The most
austere opponents of NATO enlargement in Russia, especially
among the legislators, urge their Government to send a message
westwards that, in case NATO expands its nuclear coverage, Rus-
sia will relinquish its policy of nuclear disarmament, and the first
target of the new policy will be present and future START com-
mitments. The ratification of START II is stuck in the Russian
legislature ("Duma") due to technical reasons predominantly ac-
counting to the lack of resources to build nuclear single-war-
heads and destroy multiple-warheads. The possibility of hearing
new excuses, however, should not be ruled out.
It is of utmost importance that bilateral nuclear disarma-
ment does not become a hostage to political blackmail. By offer-
ing its offset modification in substance and implementation
time-table through START III,58 which advances a further pro-
gress in reductions, the Helsinki meeting preserved START II
before the Russian Duma and U.S. Senate begin scrambling over
ratification.
With the possible failure of the START II ratification by
Moscow, Russia would still end up with fewer nuclear weapons
that the United States (at present, 6700 and 8100 warheads re-
spectively), as many Russian missiles are rusting and aging and
have to be phased out anyway. Yet even with START III, if it is
ever to come into force, the number of the remaining Russian
and U.S. nuclear war-heads will remain in the thousands - more
than needed even for Cold War containment policies. If a be-
nign spirit prevails after the first wave of NATO enlargement, it
would be feasible to predict a continuing strategic nuclear dis-
armament. A future START IV could then expand its scope to
include other NATO nuclear powers such as the United King-
dom and France, in spite of the latter's absence from the NATO
military structures.
Apart from these commitments and in response to NATO's
pledge of non-deployment, the geographical deployment of stra-
tegic weapons, especially in Russia, somehow ought to be ad-
dressed as a response to a greater security from a nuclear threat,
57. Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Further Re-
duction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Jan. 3, 1993).
58. Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Further Re-
duction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, to be signed following the ratifica-
tion of START II by the Russian Federation.
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even if theoretical. This need is of paramount relevance to the
Helsinki deal on interpretation and possible amendments of the
Treaty between the United States and the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
("ABM Treaty"). 9 Because Lithuania, like any other NATO as-
pirant, remains within the reach of Russia's unprohibited short-
range missiles that are able to carry weapons of mass destruction,
it is only natural to wish to be protected by a counter-balancing
missile defense system that is compatible with ABM Treaty provi-
sions. No individual Central European state, without the collec-
tive defense of NATO, could afford an adequate defense of that
kind.
Bilateral nuclear disarmament must not be prejudiced by
multilateral commitments, especially under the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty6 °  ("NPT"). Lithuania welcomes the further
denuclearization of Europe and the rest of the world through
gradual steps. Such steps would include implementation of the
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty6 ("CTBT") strengthening of
the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency62 ("IAEA")
safeguards, and proceeding with negotiations on a treaty effec-
tively banning production of missile material and dual use tech-
nologies for military use, or the so-called "Cut-off Treaty."
D. Fear of Lines of Division in Europe
One of the dilemmas which was stunningly exaggerated and
misinterpreted when pondering a new European security system,
59. Treaty between the United States and Soviet Union on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems, 11 I.L.M. 784-803 (1972) [hereinafter ABM Treaty]. A Proto-
col to the ABM Treaty entered into force on May 24, 1976. 13 I.L.M. 904 (1974).
60. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (1970). This treaty stemmed
from concern about the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond those states
which already had them. 35 I.L.M. 809, 855 n.31. The United States and the Soviet
Union designed it to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, while promoting the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Id. The Final Document on Extension of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed on May 11, 1995. See 34
I.L.M. 959 (1995).
61. The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, 35 I.L.M. 1439 (1996) (designed to ban
all testing of nuclear weapons and explosives).
62. International Atomic Energy Agency: Convention on Nuclear Safety, 33 I.L.M.
1514 (1994) [hereinafter IA.EA]. The Vienna-based IAEA is entrusted with verification
of compliance with the NPT as well as other regional treaties on nuclear weapons-free
zones (Pelindhaba, Rarotonga, Tlatelolco). The verification system is called "IAEA safe-
guards."
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and NATO's role in it, is the fear of new dividing lines, such as
iron curtains, walls, or, in Havel's terminology, tectonic cracks.63
The notion of such lines frightens nearly everyone and is widely
rejected as being unacceptable to either large or small scale
maps of Europe. Such an oversimplified quest for an ideal solu-
tion, however, only exists in science fiction, and practically, leads
nowhere. The deadlock is based on the wrong presumption that
lines are always harmful and that there can be a world without
them.
In reality, lines do exist and they can be useful. Lines de-
noting interests are as inevitable as the "thickest" dividing lines,
those of state borders. Ironically, the inviolability of state bor-
ders is a universal principle of international law. Throughout
history, the role of state borders has been diverse. Frontiers can
both divide and unite. Similarly, so may new lines drawn by
NATO enlargement. It is crucial to design patterns of lines that
will be the most capable of contributing to international unity
and security, and the least likely to be divisive. NATO enlarge-
ment is confronted with the same reality which, if perceived dis-
tortedly, will hamper attempts to allow NATO to conduct its true
mission. Whatever NATO's decision will be, lines will exist any-
way. The primary question is whether these lines are natural or
arbitrary. This issue must be at the heart of NATO's delibera-
tions on enlargement.
Natural lines will bring and contribute to stability. They will
be the lines of common values, based on the criteria that are
voluntarily endorsed by the community of democratic states.
Many of Clinton's speeches about world politics declare that
freedom's boundaries now should be defined by new behavior,
not old history nor old thinking. At the North Atlantic Council
Ministerial Meeting in Sintra, Portugal, on May 29, 1997, Made-
leine Albright said that a Europe without divisions is not a Eu-
rope without distinctions. Such distinctions, however, must be
based on new behavior and evolving realities, rather than old
history or geography. With respect to NATO, the lines of new
behavior should be lines of democracy, freedom, stability, and
security, because these are the values that NATO defends. What
side of those lines to support will be every sovereign nation's
choice. Natural lines will be a stabilizing element of newly cre-
63. Vaclav Havel, NATO's Quality of Life, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1997, at A21.
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ated political reality in Europe, gradually vanishing as Europe
integrates.
On the other hand, forcibly imposed arbitrary lines will en-
counter the same end as did the Berlin Wall. Anxiety and insta-
bility will increase if democratic states are not allowed to make
their own choice, or this choice is not respected, and they are
arbitrarily forced out of the space that they would like to share
with others. If we want to avoid the emergence of arbitrarily
manufactured and destabilizing lines, the genuine desire of the
Central European nations to be NATO members64 and their re-
cent behavior to facilitate their acceptance into NATO, all point
toward such acceptance.
III. TOWARDS A FUTURE LITHUANIAN NATO MEMBERSHIP
Lithuania's interest in NATO membership does not come at
the expense of its desire to enter the European Union, rather,
the two are coexisting, independent, and primary goals. Recog-
nition of an existing link between NATO and the European
Union might facilitate the processes that contributes to the unifi-
cation of Europe. One of the possibilities is the preservation of
equal treatment of NATO and EU aspirants, avoiding double
standards regarding requirements for admission. Such conduct
would be essential in avoiding artificial dividing lines, and would
be mutually conducive to the evolution of both processes.
A. Lithuania's Actions Demonstrate Its Commitment to NATO
The basic criteria for membership could be drawn from the
North Atlantic Treaty, and were more broadly outlined in the
Study on NATO enlargement officially released by NATO in Sep-
tember 1995. Only a country that adheres to the universal values
that NATO defends can aspire for admission into the alliance.
Those are the values of democracy, individual liberty, rule of law,
market economy, determination to protect peace, stability, good
neighborly relations, and well-being of allies. New members are
expected to strengthen the organization and contribute to the
achievement of its goals. In particular, new members must be
able to comply with the organization's military standards.
64. NATO applicants are Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slo-
venia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia.
1997] 1669
1670 FORDHAM INTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1636
"NATO enlargement is not a scholarship program," said Albright
at the Sintra NATO ministerial meeting. The organization is de-
clared open to every state which meets those criteria.
Lithuania's authorities and citizens are well aware of those
criteria. After the relatively short period since re-establishing its
independence, Lithuania has made stunning progress towards
meeting NATO standards. Lithuanians re-built a democratic
state based on universal and European standards of law, and
human, civil, and minority rights. Minorities of Lithuania not
only enjoy formal rights which are protected by a government
committed to international rules, but there exists centuries' long
traditions of tolerance and co-habitation that enables minorities
to regard Lithuania as their true homeland. Ethnic Lithuanians
regard Lithuanian citizens of other native backgrounds as assets,
enriching the culture of their State.
One of the assurances of Lithuania's security and well-being
is good relations with neighbors. All of Lithuania's neighboring
countries regard it as a peace-loving and friendly nation. Lithua-
nia has neither border problems nor disputed territories. Its
commitment to free market reforms is evident from the Lithua-
nian political parties' consensus about Lithuanian membership
in the European Union.
As a member of the international community, Lithuania is
deeply committed to the universal goals enshrined in the U.N.
Charter. Lithuania has always been an inseparable part of the
European culture and history, and shares in the European
dream of a united and prosperous Europe. Lithuania assumes
her fair share of responsibility for that goal by contributing her
peacekeeping troops to the common effort in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina under the command of NATO. Together with other Baltic
States and Poland, Lithuania is preparing for an increased con-
tribution to international peacekeeping by establishing joint
peacekeeping units.
Lithuania is restructuring its military forces as well as its civil
infrastructure, which will form an integral part of NATO assets.
This restructuring includes the development of a civilian con-
trolled military and adjustment of command and improved con-
trol and communication systems to achieve interoperability with
those of NATO. Our military staff participates in the Planning
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and Review Process65 ("PARP") and follows NATO defense plan-
ning standards. Our troops have been cited for professional per-
formance in numerous activities undertaken within the PFP.66
Every third Lithuanian officer has participated in various short
training courses and peacekeeping exercises at NATO military
training grounds. The Lithuanian army is modernizing its hard-
ware. The defense budget has been doubled with the intention
to spend the entire increase for continued participation in the
PFP. All of these developments demonstrate Lithuania's deter-
mination to comply with NATO standards.
B. Avoiding A Double Standard
The indispensable boundaries of NATO encircle those
countries that share the same values. Admitted adherence to
these values is determined by a formal decision based on certain
criteria. A fair and objective judgment about a candidate coun-
try's eligibility for NATO membership is a crucial prerequisite
for the credibility of the organization itself. Otherwise, a per-
ceived double standard would raise serious doubts about the
genuine goals of the alliance in the eyes of all states, including
Russia.
The completion of all undertakings aimed at membership
in NATO now depends on the prospect of the membership it-
self. NATO's history shows that membership standards were
sometimes met only after a country's admission, as was the case
in the acceptance of Spain, Portugal, and Turkey. NATO did
not require perfection of democratic development in these
cases. Rather, the admission accelerated development of their
democracy and contributed to the development of friendly rela-
tions, or at least those that exclude any chance of armed conflict,
as in the case of Turkey and Greece. Even now Lithuania's rela-
tions with neighbors are more constructive than those between
Greece and Turkey. The elimination of a threat cannot be en-
sured by unilateral actions and concessions. Even the presup-
65. The Planning and Review Process is a politico-military arrangement in the
framework of the PFP that is designed to achieve a greater interoperability between
NATO and partner states, furthering the purposes of PFP.
66. See supra note 19 (discussing PFP). The PFP was originally an initiative by U.S.
President Clinton, institutionalized in 1994, aimed at bringing together the NATO
member-states and Central and Eastern European states for cooperation in security is-
sues.
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posed situation where a country is threatened by anyone when a
threatened nation has done everything to avoid such situation
cannot be honestly regarded as an obstacle for membership in
NATO. U.S. Secretary of State Albright rightly noted that if
NATO were open only to countries menaced by aggressive
neighbors, virtually no current ally would qualify.67 Although
this was her response to an argument that perspective members
need no NATO umbrella because none of them faces an imme-
diate military threat, it is also consistent with the general discus-
sion about the membership criteria.
Official and unofficial assessments of an aspirant's compli-
ance with NATO membership criteria are always carefully noted
and analyzed. No one has argued that Lithuania or the Baltic
States do not meet the requisite political criteria. Yet already the
U.S., Danish, German, and Norwegian defense ministers implic-
itly or explicitly mentioned on various occasions that the Baltic
States are not yet prepared for membership. Because these offi-
cials are competent to speak about the military rather than the
political side of preparedness for NATO membership, one could
conclude that the Baltic States are not ready militarily. That is
weighted against the increasing feeling among the Allies' mili-
tary that the front-runners for NATO seats, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland, will be fully adapted and integrated into
NATO's defense systems within ten years after their admission.
One could further comprehend that it is only the technical side
which should be tackled in order to ensure preparedness for
membership in NATO.
The issues which sometimes result in these assessments are
often unrelated to NATO membership standards or require-
ments. One issue is the defendability of the Baltic States, nega-
tive conclusions about which are inherently dangerous if they
are ever taken as a basis for a decision on admission of the Baltic
States. This would not only produce double standards but would
send the signal of a mediocre approach toward assessment in a
case where objectivity and sincerity are necessary.
NATO has a history which resolutely refutes such arguments
of indefensibility. If the alliance was determined and able to de-
fend West Berlin, Northern Norway, Denmark (Bornholm), or
Turkey during the Cold War, indefensibility of the Baltic States
67. Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger is Better, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 21, 22.
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could only mean that either NATO has lost its essential capabili-
ties, or lacks political will. Hawaii in the Second World War, Ku-
wait in the Gulf War, and the Federal Republic of Germany in
the event of a break-out of European conflict during the Cold
War, were all arguably undefendable in the first phase of con-
flict. The issue of defendability must be based on the question
of what is worth defending, rather than what is easy to defend.
A similar question is often asked about the willingness of
Americans to have their sons die for Vilnius, Warsaw, or
Ljubljana. Just as the United States understood its international
interests and obligations in the 1950s differently than it did in
the 1920s, so it is that the new generation in Europe and North
America of the 2000s will also redefine their interests. How
many Americans in the 1920s would have linked their national
security to that of Brussels, Rome, or Oslo? The failure of the
United States, and, more poignantly, the failure of most of Eu-
rope, to link their interests in the 1930s to that of Prague, or to
the Baltic States, resulted in calamity. Are Americans ready to
defend Athens, Ankara, or Reykjavik but not the Baltic States?
In the light of ample assurances by American leaders to their
public that extension of security guaranties, for example, in Arti-
cle 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to the Central and Eastern
Europe will actually reduce the risk that American troops will
again be called to fight in Europe, where and why does this line
of doubt cut Europe in two? Is it not the purpose of interna-
tional statesmen and leaders to see above and beyond paro-
chially interpreted national interests?
There is also a danger involved in applying geopolitical cri-
teria as requirements for NATO membership. The credibility of
NATO would be seriously undermined if a perspective member's
eligibility is judged depending on whether it has a common bor-
der with Germany or Russia, in other words, whether it lives in a
"good" or "bad" neighborhood. Yet, when Poland is named as
the most likely candidate for the first wave, the geopolitical argu-
ments are the most likely to back such statements. Without prej-
udice to the eligibility of Poland, and the vital interest of Lithua-
nia that Poland is among the first new members of NATO, such
statements pose natural question for Lithuanians. These ques-
tions include whether Poland's location is strategically better
than Lithuania's location. Both countries are on the Baltic sea
coast, both share borders of a similar length with Russian Kalin-
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ingrad's region and Belarus. Geographically Lithuania's eastern
border is not further to the East than the eastern Polish border.
The main difference is that Poland borders with Germany, the
ultimate supporter of Poland's membership in NATO. If geo-
graphical location is among the criteria, then ideas about a
united Europe and Western pledges for democracy will be dis-
tant dreams to states that are currently disadvantaged by God's
will. On the other hand, failure to see the strategic importance
of the Baltic state's location for NATO would be a short-sighted
view.
Thus, instead of defendability, the true argument at the
heart of NATO enlargement must be over standards, either sin-
gle or double. Is NATO an alliance of Western democratic
states, sharing common traditions or values, or does it only rep-
resent the dated interests of its current members, as defined by
the international conditions of the 1950s and 1960s? Will any-
one dare say in the Madrid Summit that Europe's future has
been predetermined by Reich Germany's Foreign Minister Herr
Ribbentropp?
A single standard must be applied in negotiations and deci-
sions about new NATO entrants. Lithuania expects that the de-
cisions will be taken by a competent body of the organization
upon objective and transparent criteria. No nation that is not
bound by the North Atlantic Treaty should have a veto or any
"droit de regard" in determining the fate of other nations. A
strong "no" on the Russian veto was reaffirmed by the Founding
Act, stating that the provisions of the Act would not provide
NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions
of the other nations, nor would they infringe upon or restrict the
rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and
action. The provisions must not be used as a means to disadvan-
tage the interests of the other states affected by them. Lithuania
wishes to have, in reality, a constant ground to believe in the
sincerity of numerous declarations by the West that there is no
right of veto by non-NATO countries.
C. The Relationship Between NATO Enlargement and EU
Enlargement
There is no formal link between the two processes that will
plot Europe's future, namely, NATO and EU enlargement. Until
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recently, the headquarters of both institutions intentionally
avoided close contacts. The relationship had even long been de-
nied. Reality, however, is gradually forcing the skeptics to either
see the obvious existence of this relationship or deny it, which
could result in failed strategies about Europe future.
There is an inherent political logic for the two processes to
be dependent on each other. They will both shape the future of
the continent. Both institutions are simultaneously approaching
the deadline for crucial decisions surrounding their adaptation
and enlargement. They are on the very top of political agendas
in every European state and across the Atlantic. Both processes
encompass a similar geographic scope. In terms of security,
both institutions have converging directions of evolution.
NATO is developing its European identity of union. The con-
cept of a Common Joint Task Force6" is a sign that the European
Union is pondering its future defense identity. However thin,
the Western European Union is an institutional link between the
two structures. Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged and con-
tained in every textbook on international politics that the Euro-
pean Union provides soft security guarantee, which comple-
ments the hard security provided by NATO. Countries of Cen-
tral Europe cooperate on equal footing in all three
organizations, thus preserving the congruence of the overall Eu-
ropean integration process. Last but not least, the study on
NATO enlargement itself contains a clause that the most antici-
pated perspective members of NATO are those that are parties
to the Association Agreements with the European Union, and
are thus prospective EU members.
The absence of the United States from the European Union
has been the main factor for denying a formal relationship be-
tween NATO and the European Union, however, this separating
factor has faded away to become its antithesis. The United States
is now one of the main, centripetal forces of European conver-
gence. Although some U.S. politicians support membership of
NATO aspirants in the European Union as a precondition to
68. A common joint task force is an arrangement that allows the European mem-
bers of NATO, including members of the Western European Union, to use NATO as-
sets, for their own collective purposes, without involvement of United States and Can-
ada.
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NATO membership, the American administration is not willing
to do so.
The linkage of NATO and EU enlargement mostly has been
regarded as mutually complementary in some aspects, and
viewed, by some politicians, as mutually reinforcing processes.
There have been interpretations of one-direction linkage, the
most frequent of which is understanding that NATO aspirants'
membership in the European Union would facilitate NATO en-
largement. The case of Turkey defies guaranties in the opposite
direction, demonstrating that membership in NATO does not
secure a place in the European Union. This approach can be
detected in the United States where a significant number of poli-
ticians support the fastest possible EU enlargement. A similar
approach, although for different motives, can be observed in the
EU Member-States that are not NATO members, most notably
Sweden and Finland. These two Nordic countries cannot for-
mally push the membership of the Baltic States in NATO, how-
ever, they declared their respect for the choice of the sovereign
Baltic States to seek security assurances as considered best suita-
ble for themselves. The strength and frequency of such argu-
ments has aroused a somewhat irritated reaction in the Euro-
pean Commission,69 which has established its own modalities,
criteria, and logic of EU enlargement. Its members, including
the Commissioner for External Relations, Hans van den Broek,
have repeatedly made a firm point that the European Union
cannot be regarded as a shelter for those who will be left out of
NATO enlargement.
IV. A Two-Pronged Solution to Include Lithuania in NATO
Some Europeans perceive NATO enlargement as the price
to keep the United States engaged in Europe. The U.S. role,
seen by Lithuanian politicians, is not so narrow or simplistic.
Baltic nations need continuing U.S. support of Baltic determina-
tion to be full fledged members of the democratic, stable, and
prosperous Euro-Atlantic space without which the United States
itself cannot prosper. It is, therefore, not only for the benefit of
Lithuania that NATO commit to include the Baltic States in the
69. See GEORGE BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAw 57-63 (1993) (discussing Commissions's composition and duties).
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first waves of admission, but rather, for the benefit of all NATO
members.
A. A Strong NATO Commitment to Include the Baltic States
Professor Landsbergis vividly rebuffs the special case notion
that:
Lithuania seeks to be seen as an individual country, not as a
kind of mushroom in a basket which is now called "the Baltic
States." Now here they are, all three of them, and either we
allow all three of them get out or let all three stay in that
basket and wait for better times. No, the unfortunate "special
case" of the Baltic States must be reversed and made a "nor-
mal case." We are a "regular case," normal countries, and we
are Europe. Let somebody explain to us why should it be
otherwise.
70
Treating the Baltic countries separately from other Central
European countries is counterproductive with respect to their
interests. It would be an attempt to draw an artificial line be-
tween the countries that were incorporated into the Soviet
Union and those that have not been, and would subsequently
lead to doubling the standards for NATO admission. Although
the Baltic States' struggle for statehood was a special case, today
there should not be any special Baltic case with regard to NATO
enlargement. All applicant countries share the same values and
all must have a level playing field. There is no exclusive or spe-
cial role of NATO for the Baltic States, rather, there is the single
common role of the Alliance to consolidate democracies, and
promote the stability, security, and prosperity of Central Euro-
pean countries, including Lithuania.
Trying to avoiding the notion of a special case, Lithuanian
diplomats and politicians are cautious about initiatives for vari-
ous special agreements and charters. Caution accompanied the
news in Vilnius about the so-called Baltic Action Plan" elabo-
rated by the U.S. State Department or the need of a special rela-
70. Chairman of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis,
lecture at the Estonian Parliament, Jan. 21, 1997; Chairman of the Seimas of the Repub-
lic of Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis, lecture at the Royal Institute of International
Relations of Belgium, Mar. 6, 1997.
71. The Baltic Action Plan is an initiative by the U.S. administration, officially
aimed at cooperation in the field of security. Presently, the Baltic Action Plan is unoffi-
cial and incomplete.
167719971
1678 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1636
tionship or charter between the Baltic republics and NATO, as
conveyed by French diplomats. Lithuanian officials endorse the
idea of any special relationship on the essential condition that it
must be conducive to a shortcut to NATO admission, and not a
detour or alternative, whether temporary or permanent. This is
where Lithuania will draw a hard-line, because any trade-off on
this stand will compromise the security of the State.
On September 6, 1996, when visiting Stuttgart, Germany,
the former U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher came for-
ward with the idea of an Atlantic Partnership Council ("APC").
Now, since its foundation in Sintra on May 29, 1997, it is known
as Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council72 ("EAPC"). It merged PFP
and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council ("NACC"), thus
combining practical and political areas of cooperation that were
accessible to partner States.
Lithuania sees merits in this creation because the creation
reflects various aspirations of partners. APC is not an alternative
to NATO membership, but a means of cohesion with NATO
through advanced interoperability, the development of national
military forces, and an instrument to prepare technically for
NATO membership and consolidate the entire process of NATO
enlargement. The Council, therefore, must be based on the
principle of self-differentiation, that is, a choice of each partner
within the EAPC for an individual menu of cooperation with
NATO, depending on whether a partner is willing to join NATO
or has other plans. EAPC will fail if it is regarded as an alterna-
tive for those who will not be invited to become NATO members
in Madrid.
With the establishment of the EAPC with such a broad man-
date, Europeans should now ponder on the role of the OSCE.
The latter could, of course, retain with its current mandate, but
it will lose its relative political significance. Having similar mem-
bership and goals, a merger of the EAPC and the OSCE could,
perhaps, be one of the choices on the table of the discussion
about a pan-European security architecture.
Furthermore, in the search for consistent and optimal solu-
tions, Lithuania has been pursuing its foreign policy, advocating
the equal treatment of all applicants for NATO membership.
72. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [hereinafter EAPC] is composed of the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council [hereinafter NACC] and the PFP.
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The idea behind this policy is keeping all aspirants on the path
of those reforms required by NATO membership. The crucial
element of such equal treatment would be recognition of all ap-
plicant countries as potential allies in NATO. It is understanda-
ble that membership in the alliance could be granted on the
strict condition of the merits that each applicant country demon-
strates. Although the final accession of all countries may and
probably will differ in timing, the pre-accession treatment of ap-
plicant countries must not differ.
In light of the realities and the dominating opinion that the
Baltic States cannot be in the first wave of NATO enlargement, it
is of utmost importance to ensure that such statements do not
prejudge objective decision-making on what countries will be the
first to be invited to join the alliance. If a prejudicial policy of
acceptance succeeds, serious doubts about NATO's open-door
policy will arise. From a Lithuanian perspective, in order to
avoid such outcomes, at least one Baltic state must be included
in the first wave. Such a victory for one Baltic state would be a
victory for all of the Baltic States.
In a less desirable but more realistic chain of events, the
Baltic States will not be invited to join NATO in the Madrid Sum-
mit on July 8-9. In this case, the first wave must. be followed by a
strong NATO commitment to include Baltic States in following
waves of admission, best of all, before the actual first-wave en-
largement takes place. This move would demonstrate that
NATO remains open, and eliminates the impression of a fluctu-
ating NATO enlargement by opening and closing NATO's door.
If the Summit appears to be the only chance for admission, Al-
bright's prediction that there would be a mad scramble to get on
board in Madrid with a crushing sense of disappointment among
those left behind, and her prediction that those states that are
permanently shut out would be tempted to search for security by
other means, including arms build-ups and other destabilizing
behavior, might come true. Perhaps, not in such a direct sense
of these words, but the situation might deteriorate along similar
lines.
Throwing the Baltic States off the boat headed for NATO
will result in predictable consequences, including worsening re-
lations with Russia, and danger to the present pace of demo-
cratic reforms. It will definitely draw new artificial and hardly
erasable lines, which will remain as ugly scars on Europe's face
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and signs of big mistakes committed before the very dawn of a
new millennium.
B. Support of the United States of America
In this century, the fate of the Baltic States has been directly
connected to the United States. This is so because the United
States plays a vital role in the history of Europe, of which the
Baltic States have always been an integral part, linked through
history, culture, and thinking. Lithuania has an undisputed rec-
ord of loyalty to the United States, and the United States has
always responded with the same attitude toward Lithuania.
The greatest and most appreciated testimony of U.S. devo-
tion to the Baltic States was the policy of non-recognition of the
Baltic States' annexation by the Soviet Empire, which disrupted
the existence of the three states, which were members of the
League of Nations, in the 1920s and 1930s. When the world was
divided into the United Nations and the Captive Nations super-
vising the process of decolonization of Western empires, Ameri-
cans have consistently shown justice to the European nations
that were victims of World War II. On all occasions, the Ameri-
can leaders and the American people supported the Baltic peo-
ple by the uninterrupted preservation of their embassies in
Washington, by leading the CSCE Helsinki Process7 3 which
paved the way for the Baltic independence day, and now by sup-
porting the aspirations of the Baltic nations to belong to the
family of like-minded European nations.
Numerous statements by the U.S. President and the leaders
of the U.S. administration prove the sincerity of the U.S. posi-
tion. The legislators that represent wide layers of the American
society have also lent their support to the Lithuanian, Latvian,
and Estonian people. Bills and resolutions passed by Congress
and the Senate indicate that U.S. support is united, and is not a
pawn of internal politics. Such steps are awaited by Vilnius, Riga,
and Tallinn from other European capitals.
America's support for the Baltic States is wholly consistent
with its support for the Euro-American values that flow from
Voltaire, Hobbes, Locke, and Smith to Jefferson, Hamilton,
Madison, and Lincoln. The United States has traditionally
73. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Madrid Session, 22 I.L.M.
1395 (1983) [hereinafter CSCE] (defining and describing Helsinki Process).
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avoided long-term strategic commitments to international part-
ners. As the world shrinks, however, the United States will de-
fine and design its international role in the twentieth century,
and should build upon this common European-American heri-
tage it shares with the Baltic States. Lithuanians fought with
Americans during her revolution, with the forces of the Union
during the Civil War, and in all services of all twentieth century
wars and battles. At the turn of the century, Lithuanian immi-
grants built up the United States industrial base that is so vital to
its world leadership. After World War II, Lithuanian refugees
helped build the United States high-tech, aerospace, computer,
and information industries to prepare her for the next millen-
nium.
CONCLUSION
If there are lines to be drawn across or between continents,
certainly they should not be drawn between the United States
and the Baltic States. Since the Baltic States' accession to the
United Nations, few countries have supported the U.S. positions
as closely as the Baltic States. This support is not out of blind
loyalty or appreciation, but derives from the sharing of common
values, principles, and beliefs.
On the issue of NATO enlargement, Lithuania does not
look to either NATO or the United States for favors. We do not
seek to conspire against any third party. We seek nothing more
and nothing less than to be a part of a global alliance of democ-
racies.
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